

**Table X1. The Retail Value of Transnational Crime**

Drug Trafficking	\$426 billion to \$652 billion
Small Arms & Light Weapons Trafficking	\$1.7 billion to \$3.5 billion
Human Trafficking	\$150.2 billion
Organ Trafficking	\$840 million to \$1.7 billion
Trafficking in Cultural Property	\$1.2 billion to \$1.6 billion
Counterfeiting	\$923 billion to \$1.13 trillion
Illegal Wildlife Trade	\$5 billion to \$23 billion
IUU Fishing	\$15.5 billion to \$36.4 billion
Illegal Logging	\$52 billion to \$157 billion
Illegal Mining	\$12 billion to \$48 billion
Crude Oil Theft	\$5.2 billion to \$11.9 billion
Total	\$1.6 trillion to \$2.2 trillion

SOURCE: Channing May, Transnational Crime and the Developing World (Global Financial Integrity, Washington, March 2017) at [http://www.gfintegrity.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/Transnational\\_Crime-final.pdf](http://www.gfintegrity.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/Transnational_Crime-final.pdf).

### **Drug Trafficking**

The global drug trafficking market was worth US\$426 billion to \$652 billion in 2014. It represents about one-third of the total retail value of the transnational crimes studied here.

. . . Amphetamine-type stimulants (ATS) and cannabis are produced all over the world, while the production of cocaine and opiates is concentrated in South America and Afghanistan, respectively.

Drug trafficking organizations (DTOs), organized crime groups (OCGs), guerrilla groups, and terrorist organizations are all involved in drug trafficking. OCGs in West Africa have increased their control of the drug market in the region, and the volume of heroin trafficked from Afghanistan through East Africa is escalating, stoking consumption.

#### **Western Drug Policy has exported problems to the developing world:**

The image of a developed world bearing the brunt of a drug trade from which a criminal elite of producers and traffickers in the developing world enrich themselves, is a myth. Indeed commentators go so far as to argue that “Problems have been exported from consuming countries to countries involved in production and transit” (Ralph Seccombe, "Squeezing the balloon: international drugs policy" in *Drug and Alcohol Review*, vol. 14, pp. 311-316 (1995) p.314).

“It is scarcely surprising that demand for drug, especially (but not only) in rich countries, is met through the cultivation of illicit crops in remote, impoverished areas in countries with weak administration and widespread corruption often such areas are in border regions marked by violent ethnic or political conflict. Under such circumstances, poor farmers find the rewards of breaking the law irresistible. The prospect is that these factors will continue to operate in future (Seccombe 1995 p. 313).

**Ineffectiveness of supply reduction.**

Indeed growth in drug trade under world wide prohibition is evidence of drug law enforcement stimulating drug supply.

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**The high seizure rates required to put a major trafficker out of business pose a substantial challenge to law enforcement**

Profit margins for a major trafficker at different seizure rates

Seizure Rates	High case	Low case
10%	58%	26%
25%	49%	14%
40%	37%	<b>bust</b>
60%	5%	<b>bust</b>

Example:  
Afghan traffickers

- A sustained seizure rate of over 60% is required to put a successful trafficker out of business
  - anecdotal evidence suggests that seizure rates as high as 80% may be needed in some cases
- Sustained successful interventions on this scale have never been achieved

Source: HMG data, team analysis

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SOURCE: Leaked confidential briefing paper prepared at the instance of the Home Office in 2003 for the British Cabinet UK 2003: United Kingdom, Strategy Unit, *SU Drugs Project: Phase 1 Report: Understanding the Issues* (13 June 2003) at <http://image.guardian.co.uk/sys-files/Guardian/documents/2005/07/05/Report.pdf>.