Title: INCB Report Card
Author: Brian McConnell
Company: ***

Analysis of INCB Annual Reports
Date | INCB Statements and Claims | Outcome | Comment

1999

Global Drug Control Has Succeeded, But Fresh Challenges Loom, INCB Says ( Headlines of media release by INCB 23 Feb 1999)

Licit drug control
•	In the licit narcotics control – the major responsibility of the INCB – estimates of production and consumption shows that 42% of opium produced is unaccounted for. (INCB Annual report 1999)
Illicit drug control
•	Opiate seizures worldwide represent some 8% to 15% of the estimated world production. In 1997, this interception rate was about 14% … The remaining 86% (amounting to more than 400 tonnes of heroin) of the 1997 world production is assumed to have been potentially available to global illicit markets.(UNDCP report, 1999)
•	Estimated production of illicit opium in 1998 is 3,765 tonnes which the UNDCP says is a substantial decrease over previous years but is “largely as a result of extreme weather conditions in some major producer countries in South-West and South-East Asia. (UNDCP report, 1999)
•	Opium farmgate prices decreased in all global illicit opium producing areas. (UNDCP report, 1999)
•	In 1999 Afghanistan produced an estimated 4,600 tonnes of raw opium gum, which is more than double the estimated 2,100 tonnes in 1998. (Australian Illicit Drug Report 1998/99)
•	In Australia heroin usage is increasing, purity is increasing and price is decreasing. (Australian Illicit Drug Report 1998/99)
•	“the increasing indoor cultivation of cannabis…and intensified cultivation….has increased the availability of cannabis..(INCB Media release, 23 Feb 2000, See also “Cannabis Abuse on the Rise, INCB Media release, 23 Feb 2000)

These results show a failure of drug control:
•	86% availability of heroin amounts to a failure to control the drug. 
•	The greatest effect on the production of heroin has been the weather, not the INCB.
•	Global drug control has not succeeded if cannabis use has increased.
•	Increasing usage, increasing purity and decreasing prices are all signs of increasing black market supplies. Not a sign of control.

1999 | The results obtained by Bolivia and Peru in the eradication of coca bush are encouraging. (statement by L Martins President INCB, 1999) | “the impressive achievements in reducing illicit coca bush cultivation in Bolivia and Peru in the past two years seem to have been offset by the increasing production of coca leaf in Colombia” (INCB Media release, 23 Feb 2000) | Control efforts in Bolivia and Peru have led to diversification into opium poppy growing and a shift of the problem to Colombia (“The Andean Coca War” in The Economist, 4 March 2000, p. 21).

1995

“Protecting the well-being of the individual and society is the purpose of prohibiting the non-medical use of drugs, which is certainly not an attempt to limit human rights. The Board wishes to draw attention to the confusion created by some advocates of legalization of the non-medical use of drugs with their statements about human rights. The prevention of drug abuse problems by means of national and international control and demand reduction activities can be regarded as a basic right of the individual and society” (INCB report, 1994, §22)

In its fruitless crusade against drug abuse the Board lacks appreciation of the suffering and misery that the policies it advocates inflict on the very people it should be protecting – the young and their families. 
The Board’s policies:
(a)	are failing to curb the increasing availability of drugs at lower prices and higher purity levels to younger and younger children;
(b)	ignore the breaches of human rights involved in:
•	marginalising addicted drug users as criminals rather than treating them as human beings with a health problem;
•	linking punishment to involuntary treatments that have a low chance of success
•	imprisoning vast numbers of young people in jail for property offences committed to finance their drug habit or, in countries like the United States, for relatively minor drug offences;
•	mandatory minimum sentencing introduced in response to community concern about high crime levels associated with substance abuse.

1997

The Board is concerned about the statements of some Swiss officials and others about the preliminary results of a Swiss heroin distribution project and its evaluation by an expert panel of the World Health Organisation. In reality, the project has not been completed or evaluated, and the Board says political pressure groups are trying to exploit the project to push for wider distribution of heroin. (INCB Media release)

The WHO expert review panel confirmed that over the course of the trial there were substantial improvements in health and social functioning of participants (§§5.1-5.4). It concluded that “The overall Swiss studies and their various sub-components have shown that it is medically feasible to prescribe intravenous heroin as a maintenance drug, at least under the conditions that prevailed during the studies” (§6.4). The panel added, though, that because the trial’s design involved the provision of high quality ancillary services, “The Swiss studies were not able to examine whether improvements in health status or social functioning in the individuals treated was causally related to heroin prescription per se or a result of the impact of the overall treatment programme” (§1).

If the INCB was genuinely concerned to encourage scientific research on medical use of narcotic drugs it would have encouraged further research to ascertain whether the dramatic results from the Swiss trial for severely addicted users who had failed other treatments arose from heroin maintenance or from other factors such as the psycho-social support. 
The Board also ignores the results from a follow up trial in Geneva which controlled for variables and reinforced the indication that the intervention of heroin maintenance was responsible for the improvements. (See also the British Medical Journal report).

1999 | Following completion of the evaluation of the Swiss heroin trials by WHO and examination by the INCB saw “no reason to alter its previously expressed concerns”, “does not encourage other countries to follow this course of action” and “the Board has always encouraged scientific research on the medical use of narcotic drugs …so as to create the knowledge for policy formulation”  (INCB Media release 19 May 1999) | See above | See above
1999 | The Board remains concerned over the tendency to subject very technical and scientific questions related to the medical use of psychoactive substances to public vote. Issues such as the question whether or not substances like heroin or cannabis should be used medically must be decided by science and not by public vote. (statement by L Martins President INCB) | Presumably a reference to two national referenda in Switzerland for heroin prescription and a series of referenda in a number of American States in favour of the medical use of marijuana. The referendums in Switzerland support the Federal Government’s “four pillar” drug policy which includes heroin maintenance as a treatment. | The Board is correct that how substances like heroin and cannabis are to be used medically should be decided by science. In that case the Board should give strong support to calls from informed bodies such as the House of Lord Select Committee on Science and Technology in the UK (1998), the United States Institute of Medicine (1999), the NSW Law Society and Australian Medical Association (2000) for research into medical uses and restricted use smoked marijuana in appropriate cases. The Board’s grudging tolerance of research into medical uses of marijuana and unfounded criticisms of the Swiss heroin trial (see above) shows that it does not practice what it preaches in applying scientific method to the evaluation of evidence bearing on drug policies.

1999

The Board is also concerned about the de-facto, and in some cases, de jure, decriminalization of drug use in some countries as well as the establishment of “shooting galleries” and the distribution of syringes in prison – situations which are not in strict accordance with the provisions of the conventions. (statement by L Martins President INCB, 1999)

The Board here is making veiled criticisms of:
(a)	the application of the Dutch expediency principle (regulating the exercise of the discretion to prosecute) under which limited use of marijuana is tolerated;

(a)	The Dutch restraint on prosecution of certain marijuana offences is designed to separate the illicit market for that drug from other drugs like heroin. Evidence shows that this policy is successful in fewer users move on to those other drugs. Moreover usage rates of marijuana in The Netherlands is substantially less than in the United States and Australia (15.6% of the population have ever used cannabis in The Netherlands compared to 32.9% in the United States and 39.3% in Australia).
The Dutch application of the Dutch expediency principle accords with the drug conventions. As the Board would be well aware there was not agreement that possession and other conduct relating to personal use should criminalised (see U.N. Commentary to 1961 Single Convention). Parties therefore retain their sovereign discretion whether to make such conduct a crime. Moreover, the 1988 Illicit Traffic Convention (art. 3(2)) which contemplates such action being penalised also recognises that Parties have a discretion not to criminalise such conduct having regard to its “constitutional principles and the basic concepts of its legal system”. Those words were inserted precisely to cover situations like the Dutch expediency principle and rulings of constitutional courts (such as in Germany) limiting the right to prosecute users.
The INCB criticism of The Netherlands thus shows that it both ignores evidence and it is partisan in the interpretation of the treaties it is to administer.

(b)	the expiation system adopted by South Australia and the ACT under which fixed monetary fines are imposed for minor marijuana offences rather than criminal prosecution;

(b) Expiation schemes such as exist in the ACT and South Australia for conduct relating to personal use have been shown in surveys to lead to much less harm than other criminal prosecutions and do not lead to higher drug usage rate (see National Drug Strategy monograph series numbers 34 - 38). 
On the same grounds as the Dutch expediency principle there is also no question about such schemes being consistent with the drug conventions. 
INCB criticism of the details of how parties administer penalties for personal use conduct shows the extent to which the Board is willing to meddle in internal affairs of parties trying to lessen the harm suffered by drug users.

(c)	establishment of medically supervised injecting facilities that have been carried on in The Netherlands, Germany, Switzerland and which are proposed in Victoria and the ACT; and

(c)	The Board shows its partisanship when it refers to medically supervised injecting facilities as “shooting galleries”. Such facilities in Frankfurt and elsewhere in Europe have been successful in reducing overdose deaths, attracting street users into treatment, improving their social integration. They have also produced substantial improvements in public order. 
The Board’s opposition to careful public health trials of similar facilities in Australia is a further example of the Board’s perverse refusal to recognize the role of evidence based policies. Its opposition seems based on a view that is simply not correct that the drug conventions permit only abstinence based interventions. The conventions are silent on this point leaving the sovereign discretion of parties unfettered.

| | (d)	the syringe distribution program in some Swiss prisons. | d) The Board’s opposition to syringe distribution in prisons is incompatible with the demonstrated value of syringe distribution to combat the spread of blood borne viruses among intravenous drug users who form 70% or more of prison populations. Is the Board challenging the legality under the conventions of Australia’s general syringe distribution system? The Board’s attitude is an obstacle to an important public health measure of benefit to the community at large.
2000 | Drug control is no magic task – progress can be achieved through full implementation of the provisions of the international drug control treaties and a willingness to examine and discuss, openly, the causes and consequences of the drug problem and ways to address it. (INCB, Message from the President, 23 Feb 2000) | No outcomes can be expected from statements such as this. | The statement is a further example of the Board proclaiming the need for full and open discussion of the causes and consequences of the drug problem yet insisting that this must occur only “through full implementation” of its partisan interpretation of the drug conventions. Its mindset denies the possibility of the sort of assessment that it pays lip service to.

Statement of failure
The failure of international policies that the Board advocates is voiced eloquently in the preamble of the 1988 Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances. 76 years after the first drug convention in 1912 states were:

“DEEPLY CONCERNED by the magnitude of and rising trend in the illicit production of, demand for and traffic in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, which pose a serious threat to the health and welfare of human beings and adversely affect the economic, cultural and political foundations of society,

“DEEPLY CONCERNED ALSO by the steadily increasing inroads into various social groups made by illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, and particularly by the fact that children are used in many parts of the world as an illicit drug consumers market and for purposes of illicit production, distribution and trade in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, which entails a danger of incalculable gravity,

“RECOGNIZING the links between illicit traffic and other related organized criminal activities which undermine the legitimate economies and threaten the stability, security and sovereignty of States,

“AWARE that illicit traffic generates large financial profits and wealth enabling transnational criminal organizations to penetrate, contaminate and corrupt the structures of government, legitimate commercial and financial business, and society at all its levels”

If in the light of such lack of success the board of any enterprise continued to advocate an intensification of the same policies, it would be sacked.

Families and Friends for Drug Law Reform, 10 April, 2000,   Page